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Can we Make Them Obey? U.S. Reporting 
Companies, Their Foreign Suppliers, and the 
Conflict Minerals Disclosure Requirements of 
Dodd-Frank 
McKay S. Harline* 
Abstract: § 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protec-
tion Act targets human rights abuses abroad, rather than financial reforms at 
home. It requires certain reporting companies to make disclosures about the 
conflict minerals necessary in the production or function of their products. After 
repeated delays, the SEC finalized a conflict minerals disclosure rule, outlining 
the process companies must follow to satisfy their disclosure obligations. This 
comment discusses that process, as well as the costs imposed on the companies 
required to make conflict minerals disclosures. It also highlights an important 
effect of those costs: reporting companies will seek to improve their supply 
chains and pass some of the mandated due diligence burden to other supply 
chain businesses through contracts. But enforcement of these contracts, breach-
es, and litigation in foreign jurisdictions will all increase the total costs of the 
conflict minerals disclosure regime, including on foreign suppliers themselves. 
This comment concludes that until the international community collectively 
commits to end the conflict minerals trade, § 1502 and the SEC conflict minerals 
rule will not effectively achieve their intended benefits. The costs of compliance 
are simply too high. 
  
                                                            
* J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 2015; Bachelor of Music, Piano Performance, Brigham 
Young University, 2011. I have only ever succeeded in my endeavors because of the inspiring people in 
my life. I'm thankful for my parents, Steven and Cindy, and my sisters, Jordan and Kenzie, and all our 
moments of friend-ship, laughter, impressions, and love. And I'm grateful for my husband, Brendan 
Madden, who has not only expanded my vision, but also filled my life with goodness. Many thanks to 
the editorial board of this journal. All errors in this note, of course, are mine. 
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 I. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF THE CONFLICT 
MINERALS DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS 
Middle of the night legislative additions, regulation in unfamiliar terri-
tory, and weak first-round corporate responses: all describe the circum-
stances surrounding the Dodd-Frank conflict minerals disclosure regime. 
While § 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protec-
tion Act sought to address human rights abuses abroad, the costs and conse-
quences of doing so have sparked controversy and call its processes into 
question. As conflict minerals disclosures have ramped up companies re-
porting under the Securities Exchange Act face new challenges in a market 
that seems ever more socially conscious. 
In promulgating § 1502 of Dodd-Frank and its subsequent SEC rule, 
both Congress and the SEC overlooked the effects conflict minerals disclo-
sure requirements would have on preexisting and future contracts with for-
eign suppliers.1 § 1502 essentially requires Exchange Act reporting compa-
nies to make disclosures about conflict minerals2 necessary in the 
production or function of their products.3 The accompanying SEC rule im-
poses significant costs on the companies that are required to make these 
disclosures.4 These costs will spread to other businesses in product supply 
chains as reporting companies seek to incorporate the SEC’s mandated due 
diligence requirements into their contract terms.5 However, the intended 
                                                            
 1 The conflict minerals provisions of Dodd-Frank § 1502 and the resulting SEC rule are controver-
sial, and many have called the economic analyses of Congress and the SEC into question. See, e.g., Nat’l 
Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Sec. Exch. Comm’n, No. 13-cv-635, 2013 WL 3803918 (D.D.C. July 23, 2013) 
(summarizing some of the “more significant comments and issues considered” by the SEC during its 
rule-making process); see also The Costs and Consequences of Dodd-Frank Section 1502: Impacts on 
America and the Congo Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Monetary Policy & Trade of the H. Comm. on 
Fin. Serv., 112th Cong. 1-44 (2012) [hereinafter Costs and Consequences of Dodd-Frank] (exploring the 
impact of Dodd-Frank § 1502 on American companies and its likelihood of achieving the desired ef-
fects). This note focuses on one area these analyses overlooked: how the conflict minerals disclosure 
requirements affect private contracts. 
 2 A “conflict mineral” is defined as “columbite-tantalite, cassiterite, gold, wolframite, or their de-
rivatives” (which include tantalum, tin, and tungsten), or any other minerals or their derivatives that the 
Secretary of State determines are “financing conflict” in the Democratic Republic of Congo or any ad-
joining countries. Conflict Minerals, Exchange Act Release No. 34-67716, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,275 (Sept. 
12, 2012) [hereinafter Conflict Minerals Release]. 
 3 See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1502, 15 U.S.C. § 
78m(p) (2010). 
 4 One commentator estimated that the costs for reporting companies following the due diligence pol-
icies under § 1502 and the SEC rule would total approximately $8 billion. This would include $1.2 bil-
lion for reporting companies to “change their legal obligations with each . . . first-tier supplier,” $600 
million for implementing “risk-based programs that use control processes to verify that suppliers are 
providing them with credible information and pushing legal obligations upstream,” and $6 billion to 
“develop new information technology systems to collect information on each . . . first-tier supplier.” 
Conflict Minerals Release, supra note 2, at 56,337. 
 5 Interestingly, the idea for this note came from an assignment while the author worked as a legal 
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benefits of § 1502 may never come to fruition if U.S. companies either drop 
suppliers who are unwilling or unable to accept these requirements or bully 
others into compliance. 
This note argues that the conflict minerals disclosure requirements 
negatively impact the contractual relations between reporting companies—
those that must make the disclosures—and their upstream suppliers who are 
pressured into accepting many of the compliance costs. Part II outlines the 
standards and processes that reporting companies must follow to comply 
with the conflict minerals disclosure rules. Part III highlights the resulting 
costs for these companies. Part IV discusses the compliance costs for for-
eign suppliers. Part V reviews the first round of conflict minerals disclo-
sures, and demonstrates the difficulties reporting companies face when fil-
ing complete reports. Part VI addresses the inefficacy of forcing an 
American regulatory framework on foreign companies through contracts, 
which undermines the purposes behind Dodd-Frank § 1502. Part VII em-
phasizes the need for greater international involvement before any Ameri-
can legislation can be effective. Finally, Part VIII concludes that Congress 
and the SEC seriously underestimated the costs of making conflict minerals 
disclosures, casting doubt on whether the goals of the disclosure require-
ments can actually be achieved by the means. 
 II. WEAKEST POSSIBLE ENFORCEMENT OR ROBUST 
REGULATION? OVERVIEW OF THE CONFLICT MINERALS 
DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS 
While Congress intended that § 1502 constitute a major “step”6 in end-
ing the conflict minerals trade, many have debated both its hasty inclusion 
in Dodd-Frank7 and its unknown and unintended consequences.8 § 1502 at-
tempted to respond to the “exploitation and trade” of minerals that finance 
“extreme levels of violence” in the eastern Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC) and its surrounding countries (hereinafter covered coun-
tries).9 Clearly, the provision was not aimed at “preventing another financial 
                                                                                                                                          
intern at a major international corporation. The question presented was whether a foreign subsidiary 
must comply with Dodd-Frank § 1502’s conflict minerals disclosure requirements, and whether an 
American company could introduce those requirements as binding terms in a contract. The research was 
obviously conducted in response to a pending contract envisioning this exact situation. 
 6 Letter from Carol Brunlinger, to Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Jan. 24, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-40-10/s74010-40.htm. 
 7 See Costs and Consequences of Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, at 1 (statement of Hon. Gary G. Miller, 
Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Int’l Monetary Policy & Trade). 
 8 Laura E. Seay, CTR. FOR GLOBAL DEV., What’s Wrong with Dodd-Frank 1502? Conflict Minerals, 
Civilian Livelihoods, and the Unintended Consequences of Western Advocacy, 12 (2012) available at 
http://www.cgdev.org/blog/what’s-wrong-dodd-frank- 1502-conflict-minerals-civilian-livelihoods-and-
unintended . 
 9 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 1502(a) 
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meltdown,” the principal purpose behind the Dodd-Frank legislation.10 Ra-
ther, the measure was focused on “fostering transparency about commercial 
activities” occurring in foreign countries by requiring disclosures about 
conflict minerals in manufactured products.11 Interestingly, the Dodd-Frank 
conference committee added this provision “in the middle of the night,” 
without providing Congress with the “opportunity to consider whether it 
would help in the conflict in the DRC,” or what effects it would have on the 
minerals and goods coming from these regions into the United States.12 Re-
ally, the provision seemed “hidden” within the 2,300 pages of the Dodd-
Frank Act.13 
The complexity and controversy surrounding § 1502 ultimately caused 
repeated delays in the release of the SEC’s final conflict minerals rule.14 
The SEC received more than 13,000 letters during the rule comment period 
and held public roundtable discussions to “solicit feedback from interested 
                                                                                                                                          
(2010). See also David M. Lynn, The Dodd-Frank Act’s Specialized Corporate Disclosure: Using the 
Securities Laws to Address Public Policy Issues, 6 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 327, 336 (2011) (“In many ways, 
the provision is reflective of a notion arising from time to time in the legislative and regulatory arena 
that, when lacking any direct ability to regulate or control the activities of public issuers, indirect regula-
tion through the ‘shame’ of public disclosure has the potential to accomplish the same objectives.”). 
 10  Todd Moss, Foreword to Laura E. Seay, CTR. FOR GLOBAL DEV., What’s Wrong with Dodd-
Frank 1502? Conflict Minerals, Civilian Livelihoods, and the Unintended Consequences of Western 
Advocacy, (2012) available at http://www.cgdev.org/blog/what’s-wrong-dodd-frank’s-conflict-minerals-
provision. See also Costs and Consequences of Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, at 2 (statement of Hon. Gary 
G. Miller, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Int’l Monetary Policy & Trade) (“While it is puzzling to me that 
Section 1502 falls completely outside the scope of the Dodd-Frank Act, that legislation was passed as a 
result of the financial crisis to add stability to the financial system. Section 1502 does nothing to ‘pro-
vide for financial regulatory reform, to protect consumers and investors, to enhance Federal understand-
ing of insurance issues, or to regulate over-the-counter derivatives markets,’ which were the stated pur-
poses of the Dodd-Frank Act.”). 
 11  Moss, supra note 10. See also Letter from Randi Shroeder to Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Oct. 21, 
2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-40-10/s74010-341.htm (“Consumers need to know 
what they are buying when they buy it.”). 
 12  Costs and Consequences of Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, at 2 (statement of Hon. Gary G. Miller, 
Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Int’l Monetary Policy & Trade). Note that activist groups like the Enough 
Project had pushed for legislative solutions to harmful mineral sourcing years before Congress passed 
the Dodd-Frank Act. One such effort, centered on House Resolution 4128 never moved out of commit-
tees despite receiving support from business sectors and co-sponsorship. See Seay, supra note 8, at 12. § 
1502’s subsequent controversy helps explain why it may have been hidden within the Dodd-Frank Act. 
 13  Moss, supra note 10; see also Karen Woody, Conflict Minerals Legislation: The SEC’s New Role 
as Diplomatic and Humanitarian Watchdog, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1,315, 1,316 (2012) (“Buried in the 
voluminous Dodd-Frank . . . Act is an oft-overlooked provision requiring corporate disclosure of the use 
of ‘conflict minerals.’”). 
 14  See Costs and Consequences of Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, at 4 (statement of Hon. Carolyn 
McCarthy, Ranking Member, H. Subcomm. on Int’l Monetary Policy & Trade); see also Paul Bork & 
Dean F. Hanley, SEC Issues Long-Delayed Rule on Conflict Minerals, FOLEY HOAG (Aug. 27, 2012), 
http://www.foleyhoag.com/ 
publications/alerts-and-updates/2012/august/sec-issues-long-delayed-rule-on-conflict-minerals (“The 
SEC had been required to issue final rules by April 2011, and thus this rule-making is long overdue.”). 
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stakeholders and industry representatives.”15 This feedback called for regu-
lations ranging from “weakest possible enforcement”16 of § 1502, to “ro-
bust”17 and “forceful” rules.18 The Commission issued its final conflict min-
erals rule (hereinafter SEC rule) on September 12, 2012, which mandated 
compliance beginning on January 1, 2013.19 The first deadline for conflict 
minerals disclosures was June 2, 2014.20 
Generally, the SEC rule requires Exchange Act reporting companies to 
make conflict mineral disclosures after conducting specific country of 
origin inquiries and due diligence.21 In order to simplify the disclosure pro-
cess, the SEC outlined a three-step plan that companies must follow to de-
termine whether the rule even applies to them, and which actions need to be 
taken in order to comply with the relevant due diligence and disclosure re-
quirements.22 
 A. Step One: Determining Who Must Comply 
The SEC rule specifies three conditions that if met subject a particular 
company to the disclosure requirements. In developing these conditions, the 
SEC considered § 1502’s “legislative background” and “statutory loca-
tion.”23 First, the rule applies to any “issuer”24 that “files reports with the 
Commission under Section 13(a) or Section 15(d) of the Exchange Act.”25 
                                                            
 15  Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Sec. Exch. Comm’n, No. 13-cv-635, 2013 WL 3803918 (D.D.C. July 23, 
2013). 
 16  Letter from Lori G. Kechter, Adm’r, Outcry for Congo Campaign, to Meredith Cross, Director, 
Div. Corp. Fin., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Dec. 15, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-
40-10/s74010-3.htm. 
 17  Letter from Lieth Anderson, President, Nat’l Assoc. of Evangelicals, to Mary L. Schapiro, Chair-
woman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Feb. 17, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-40-
10/s74010-501.pdf. 
 18  Letter from Julia Westwater, to Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Feb. 28, 2012), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-40-10/s74010-511.htm. 
 19  Conflict Minerals Release, supra note 2, at 56,275. 




 21  See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1502, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376, 2223 (2010); see also Conflict Minerals Release, supra note 2, at 56,275. 
 22  Conflict Minerals Release, supra note 2, at 56,275. The SEC provided a flowchart to guide com-
panies, using a series of questions and answers and highlighting where a Conflict Minerals Report must 
be included with a Form SD. Id. at 56,283. 
 23  See Conflict Minerals Release, supra note 2, at 56,285. 
 24  An issuer is any “person, company, government, political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality 
of government” that “issues or proposes to issue any security.” Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
§ 3(a)(8)-(9), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(8)-(9) (2014). 
 25  Conflict Minerals Release, supra note 2, at 56,285. The SEC pointed out that the legislative histo-
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These sections outline the quarterly, annual, and periodic reports typically 
associated with Exchange Act reporting companies.26 Second, the rule ap-
plies to issuers that manufacture or contract to manufacture products.27 Fi-
nally, if the manufactured products involve conflict minerals “necessary” to 
their functionality28 or production,29 the issuer is subject to the SEC rule.30 
If any issuer does not satisfy each of these conditions the SEC rule does not 
apply, and no further action is necessary with regard to conflict minerals 
disclosures. However, if an issuer does meet each of the conditions the SEC 
rule applies, and mandates compliance with the additional disclosure re-
quirements. For purposes of this note, issuers satisfying these conditions are 
called “reporting companies” on account of their reporting duties to the 
SEC under §§ 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act and their disclosure obli-
gations under the SEC rule. 
 B. Step Two: Making a Reasonable Country of Origin Inquiry 
If a reporting company determines it satisfies the three conditions it 
must then turn to step two in the SEC rule’s disclosure process: conducting 
a reasonable country of origin inquiry regarding its conflict minerals.31 The 
                                                                                                                                          
ry only refers to “companies that file with or report to the Commission or that are listed on a United 
States stock exchange,” but nevertheless stated that foreign private issuers or smaller reporting compa-
nies might be included. Id. at 56,287. 
 26  Under § 13(a), issuers that have securities registered pursuant to § 12 (or sell their securities on 
national exchanges) are required to file “information and documents . . . to keep reasonably current” the 
information in their application or registration statements, as well as annual and quarterly reports. Secu-
rities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (2014). § 15(d) requires issuers that have filed 
registration statements (including under the Securities Act of 1933) to file supplementary and periodic 
information as the Commission prescribes. See id. § 78o(d). Thus, issuers that file reports under any of 
these Exchange Act sections (and that meet the other two qualifications) are subject to the SEC rule. 
 27  Conflict Minerals Release, supra note 2, at 56,283, 56,290. The SEC did not define manufacture, 
but explained that activities like servicing, maintaining, or repairing products were not considered manu-
facturing. Id. at 56,290. Similarly, the SEC did not announce a single definition of contracting to manu-
facture, though it provided guidance by framing the question as depending on an issuer’s degree of in-
fluence over the manufacturing process (including individual facts and circumstances surrounding the 
issuer’s business and industry). Id. at 56,279, 56,290. 
 28  Factors bearing on functionality include whether the conflict mineral is necessary to the product’s 
generally expected function or purpose (including any multiple generally expected functions), or, if a 
conflict mineral is a decoration or ornamentation, whether the decoration or ornamentation is the prod-
uct’s primary purpose. Id. at 56,279, 56,297. 
 29  Factors bearing on production include whether the conflict mineral is contained in and intentional-
ly added in the production process of the product or its components, or whether the conflict mineral is 
“necessary to produce the product.” Id. at 56,297. Note that even trace amounts must be considered 
when determining whether conflict minerals are necessary to the functionality or production of a prod-
uct. Id. 
 30  17 C.F.R. § 240.13p-1 (2013). 
 31  Conflict Minerals Release, supra note 2, at 56,297. But see id. at 56,280 (exempting any conflict 
minerals that are “outside the supply chain” prior to January 31, 2013). 
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SEC rule does not help reporting companies by explaining what specific 
procedures would be sufficient. Rather, it merely maintains that this inquiry 
must be performed in good faith and be “reasonably designed” to ascertain 
whether the conflict minerals originated in covered countries or from recy-
cled or scrap sources.32 The inquiry is satisfied if a reporting company re-
ceives reasonably reliable representations from suppliers and processing fa-
cilities that indicate the conflict minerals either did not originate in the 
covered countries or came from recycled or scrap sources.33 The reasonable 
inquiry does not depend on, and does not require, representations from eve-
ry supplier, although warning signs warrant additional consideration by a 
reporting company.34 
Depending on the results of the reasonable country of origin inquiry, 
reporting companies may not be required to proceed through step three of 
the SEC rule, and their disclosure obligations are limited to specific items 
on the SEC’s new Form SD. For example, if a reporting company con-
cludes that its conflict minerals did not originate in covered countries or 
that they did come from recycled or scrap sources, it need not proceed to 
step three of the SEC rule.35 Similarly, reporting companies that either have 
“no reason” to believe that their conflict minerals may have originated in 
covered countries, or that “reasonably believe” their conflict minerals came 
from recycled or scrap resources, are not responsible for proceeding to step 
three.36 In each of these cases a reporting company need only file the Form 
SD. This form must include a brief description of the reasonable country of 
origin inquiry undertaken, as well as the results of that inquiry.37 A report-
ing company demonstrates through these disclosures its basis for conclud-
ing that it does not need to proceed to step three, which would ultimately 
require the filing of a much more complete Conflict Minerals Report (dis-
                                                            
 32  Id. at 56,312. 
 33  Id. The SEC clarified it would “view an issuer as satisfying the reasonable country of origin in-
quiry standard if it seeks and obtains reasonably reliable representations indicating the facility at which 
its conflict minerals were processed and demonstrating that those conflict minerals did not originate in 
the Covered Countries or came from recycled or scrap sources. These representations could come either 
directly from that facility or indirectly through the issuer’s immediate suppliers, but the issuer must have 
a reason to believe these representations are true given the facts and circumstances surrounding those 
representations. . . . An issuer would have reason to believe representations were true if a processing 
facility received a ‘conflict-free’ designation by a recognized industry group that requires an independ-
ent private sector audit of the smelter, or an individual processing facility, while it may not be part of the 
industry group’s ‘conflict-free’ designation process, obtained an independent private sector audit that is 
made publicly available.” Id. 
 34  Id. 
 35  Id. at 56,313. This means the reporting company will not need to proceed to the more intensive 
due diligence process, and will not be required to file a Conflict Minerals Report. 
 36  Conflict Minerals Release, supra note 2, at 56,313. 
 37  Id. 
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However, a reasonable country of origin inquiry may require that a re-
porting company proceed to step three of the SEC rule. The reporting com-
pany would need to exercise due diligence and file a complete Conflict 
Minerals Report. For example, if a reporting company concludes that its 
conflict minerals did in fact originate in conflict countries and were not 
sourced from recycled or scrap materials, it is required to move to step 
three.39 Additionally, if a reporting company “has reason” to believe its con-
flict minerals may have originated in covered countries and may not have 
come from recycled or scrap sources, it is required to move to step three of 
the SEC rule.40 
 C. Step Three: Exercising Due Diligence and Filing a Conflict 
Minerals Report 
In step three, reporting companies are required to exercise due dili-
gence on the source and chain of custody of the conflict minerals in their 
products.41 The SEC rule instructs reporting companies to follow a national-
ly or internationally recognized due diligence framework.42 For example, 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) 
Due Diligence Guidelines meet this standard.43 OECD due diligence in-
volves five general components: strong company management systems, 
identification and assessment of risks in supply chains, design and imple-
mentation of strategies to respond to identified risks, independent third-
party audits, and annual reports on supply chain due diligence.44 Though 
stringent and expensive, these measures are designed to help reporting 
companies discover the true origins of the conflict materials contained in or 
used to manufacture their products. 
A reporting company’s due diligence determinations lead to one of 
two possible outcomes. First, if a reporting company determines its conflict 
minerals are from scrap or recycled sources, or that its minerals did not 
                                                            
 38  Id. 
 39  Id. For certain minerals, like gold, some conflict mineral frameworks already exist. Id. 
 40  Id. 
 41  See generally 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13p-1, 249b.400 (2013). 
 42  Conflict Minerals Release, supra note 2, at 56,326. 
 43  Id. While the SEC cited the OECD Guidelines as an acceptable standard, it clarified that any na-
tionally or internationally recognized framework would satisfy the stringent due diligence requirement 
so long as it had “been established by a body . . . that has followed due-process procedures, including 
the broad distribution of the framework for public comment,” and was “consistent with the criteria 
standards in GAGAS [Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards] established by the GAO.” 
Id. 
 44  See generally OECD, OECD DUE DILIGENCE GUIDANCE FOR RESPONSIBLE SUPPLY CHAINS OF 
MINERALS FROM CONFLICT-AFFECTED AND HIGH-RISK AREAS (2nd ed., 2013). 
6HARLINE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/29/15 2:00 PM 
Northwestern Journal of  
International Law & Business 35:439 (2015) 
448 
come from the covered countries, it need only file a Form SD.45 Alterna-
tively, if a reporting company cannot conclusively determine that its con-
flict minerals are not from covered countries or are from scrap and recycled 
sources,46 it is required to file a Form SD with a Conflict Minerals Report 
as an exhibit.47 This Conflict Minerals Report must contain: (1) a descrip-
tion of the measures taken by the reporting company in conducting its due 
diligence, (2) a certified independent private sector audit,48 and (3) a de-
scription of products that “have not been found to be DRC conflict free.”49 
Because of the detail required by the Conflict Minerals Report, the 
SEC introduced a phase-in period to allow reporting companies to prepare 
to meet all of the requirements. For two years after the SEC rule’s effective 
date, reporting companies need only describe their minerals as DRC con-
flict undeterminable in their reports if they are unable to determine the 
origin of their minerals (and whether they fund conflict).50 Additionally, the 
conflict minerals reports do not need a separate independent private sector 
audit.51 
                                                            
 45  Conflict Minerals Release, supra note 2, at 56,283. This Form SD must include a description of 
the reasonable country of origin inquiry, due diligence measures, and the results of both investigations. 
Id. 
 46  Note that if because of a reasonable country of origin inquiry a reporting company had reason to 
believe its conflict minerals may not have come from a recycled or scrap source it still needs to exercise 
due diligence. At the time of the SEC’s final rule release, however, the OECD’s supplement for gold 
was the “only nationally or internationally recognized due diligence framework for any mineral from 
recycled or scrap sources.” Issuers are required to provide Conflict Minerals Reports if they are unable 
to determine through due diligence that their conflict minerals did not come from recycled or scrap 
sources. Conflict Minerals Release, supra note 2, at 56,332-33. 
 47  Id. at 56,283. 
 48  This opinion or conclusion should highlight: (1) whether the issuer’s plan for due diligence 
measures is “in conformity with the criteria set forth in the due diligence framework,” and (2) whether 
the issuer’s described due diligence measures are “consistent with the process undertaken.” Id. Some 
issuers may qualify for a “DRC Conflict Undeterminable” exception, at least for reporting made less 
than two years (or less than four years if a smaller reporting company) after the rule’s effective date. See 
id. at 56,288, 56,321. 
 49  “DRC conflict free” means that “the product does not contain conflict minerals necessary to the 
functionality or production of that product that directly or indirectly finance or benefit armed groups.” 
Id. at 56,364. The conflict minerals report’s description of the products involves disclosing the facilities 
used to process the conflict minerals, the minerals’ country of origin, and the efforts used in determining 
the “mine or location of origin of those minerals with the greatest possible specificity.” Id. at 56,320-21. 
Note that the third requirement, describing products that have not been found to be DRC conflict free, 
has been stayed through the end of litigation in the National Association of Manufacturers, et al. v. SEC, 
etc. al. case. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recently ruled this 
provision in violation of a reporting company’s First Amendment rights. See In the Matter of Exchange 
Act Rule 13p-1 and Form SD: Order Issuing Stay, Exchange Act Release No. 72,079, 79 Fed. Reg. 
26,297 (May 7, 2014) [hereinafter Order Issuing Stay]; see generally Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 
F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014). The stay does not apply to other portions of the rule. Order Issuing Stay, su-
pra note 49, at 26,297. 
 50  Conflict Minerals Release, supra note 2, at 56,322. 
 51  Id. at 56,283. 
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Reporting companies must complete the three steps in order to comply 
with the SEC rule. They must first determine whether the SEC rule applies. 
This means reporting companies must determine whether they are § 13(a) 
or § 15(d) Exchange Act reporting issuers that manufacture or contract to be 
manufactured products involving conflict minerals necessary to the produc-
tion or manufacture of those products. If so, the reporting companies must 
then conduct a reasonable inquiry into their products’ countries of origin. 
Finally, reporting companies must exercise due diligence according to the 
results of the reasonable country of origin inquiries. 
 III. THERE ARE “NO BURDENS” ON INDUSTRY? 
COMPLIANCE COSTS FOR REPORTING COMPANIES 
While the SEC was able to simplify the conflict minerals disclosure 
process to three steps, the SEC rule imposes significant economic and ad-
ministrative burdens on reporting companies, suppliers, and manufacturers. 
For those companies handling thousands, if not millions, of parts and prod-
ucts, making any determination as to the origin of the minerals in each part 
proves a truly “Herculean” task.52 For example, Boeing’s defense business 
alone handles over 190 million parts per year.53 In 2010, these parts came 
from over 8,000 “direct” suppliers, and this does not account for any of 
Boeing’s “commercial” business.54 To complicate matters, many of Boe-
ing’s “first-tier direct suppliers” have thousands of direct suppliers them-
selves, resulting in a direct and indirect supply chain “numbering in the tens 
of thousands.”55 
A company like Boeing faces huge administrative and economic costs 
in adequately performing its reasonable country of origin inquiry and due 
diligence requirements. This process requires additional staff, an audit 
                                                            
 52  Costs and Consequences of Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, at 17. 
 53  Letter from Benedict S. Cohen, Chief Counsel for Gov’t Operations, The Boeing Co., to Mary L 
Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Oct. 17, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-40-10/s74010-436.pdf [hereinafter Cohen Oct. 17]. 
 54  For example, each new 787 Dreamliner plane contains 3.5 million parts. Id. 
 55  Id. Proponents of § 1502 maintain an unfounded assumption that costs will be “minimal,” citing 
“first-tier” suppliers as the only concern with regard to conflict minerals due diligence. Letter from Mark 
B. Taylor, Senior Researcher, Fafo Inst. for Applied Int’l Studies, to Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. 
& Exch. Comm’n (Oct. 17, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-40-10/s74010-332.pdf. 
To provide some context on the varying tiers involved in a supply chain, the National Association of 
Manufacturers submitted an example supply chain path to the SEC: (1) mining, (2) negociant, (3) comp-
toir, (4) trader, (5) ore benefication, (6) smelting, (7) refining, (8) metal sold to company A, which 
makes a metallic catalyst, (9) catalyst is sold to company B, which uses it to manufacture a polymeric 
coating, (10) company C purchases the coating and uses it to coat a part, (11) part is sold to company D, 
which uses it to make a larger part, (12) larger part is sold to company E, which uses it to make an as-
sembly, and (13) assembly is sold to company F, an auto company, which uses it in manufacturing a car. 
Letter from Franklin J. Vargo, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (July 26, 
2011) available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-40-10/s74010-280.pdf. 
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company, legal and accounting help, and the purchase of “software for data 
management.”56 Proponents claim that these are “one-time cost[s],” which 
do not “require changes in the legal obligations of all suppliers of every 
company, only those sourcing particular minerals.”57 This oversimplifies 
the systems and costs that must be put in place, however, especially where 
reporting companies interact with more than just a few suppliers. 
Preliminary estimates indicated that compliance with the SEC rule, in-
cluding the implementation of due diligence measures, would be expensive 
across entire industries. The SEC predicted the initial financial costs in es-
tablishing compliance programs would reach at least $3 billion for reporting 
companies, with possible “ongoing compliance” costs of $600 million 
thereafter.58 These appraisals seem conservative when compared to other 
recognized estimates.59 For example, a Tulane study estimated implementa-
tion costs would total $7.93 billion: 
Almost half of the total cost—$3.4 billion—would be met with in-
house company personnel time, and the rest—$4.5 billion—would com-
prise outflows to 3rd parties for consulting, IT systems and audits. Compar-
ing the costs to the issuers vs. the suppliers, the bulk of the total costs—$5.1 
billion or 65%—would be incurred by the suppliers [a group that the SEC 
analysis did not adequately consider, and which is discussed infra], while 
the smaller portion of the total—$2.8 billion or 35%—would be carried by 
the issuers.60 
Some advocates of the conflict minerals disclosure scheme claim that 
these costs represent “no ‘burden’ on industry.”61 Others, to their credit, 
recognize the very real costs for reporting companies (even as they mini-
mize them when compared to the human rights costs that would continue 
should conflict mineral mining and supply chains be perpetuated).62 Really, 
the costs extend beyond individual reporting companies to entire industries. 
The sheer number of companies involved (including both U.S. and foreign 
suppliers) could total well over 860,000.63 Reporting companies and indus-
                                                            
 56  Costs and Consequences of Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, at 17. 
 57  Taylor, supra note 55. 
 58  Woody, supra note 13, at 1,333. 
 59  One of the most dramatic estimates came from the National Association of Manufacturers, which 
predicted compliance costs would range between $8 billion and $16 billion. Id. 
 60  Chris Bayer, A Critical Analysis of the SEC and NAM Economic Impact Models and the Proposal 
of a 3rd Model in View of the Implementation of Section 1502 of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Re-
form and Consumer Protection Act, LAW PROFESSOR BLOGS 3 (Oct. 17, 2011), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/ tulane-study.pdf; see also Woody, supra note 13, at 1,333. 
 61  Letter from Ann Shannon, Co-Founder, A Thousand Sisters Campaign, to Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 
(Dec. 15, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-40-10/s74010-1.htm. 
 62  One “minimizing” statement came from Hewlett-Packard, which claimed, “in front of several oth-
er titans of the electronics industry,” that compliance with the conflict minerals rules would cost those 
companies “less than one cent per product.” Woody, supra note 13, at 1,333. 
 63  Conflict Minerals Release, supra note 2, at 56,352. 
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tries will have to adjust to bear the cost of this new disclosure process. 
 IV. WHAT INTERNATIONAL EFFECTS? POTENTIAL BURDENS 
FOR FOREIGN SUPPLIERS 
The compliance costs do not end with reporting companies, as foreign 
suppliers will need to do their own due diligence in order to provide report-
ing companies with the information they need for their conflict minerals re-
ports. These costs will extend to suppliers located in both covered countries 
and in other foreign locations. 
 A. Effects on the Covered Countries 
Compliance costs will also land on the “upstream” minerals industry 
(or suppliers and producers further up the supply chain), especially in the 
covered countries.64 The complexity of supply chains and the “lack of relia-
ble information about the source of these minerals” will only result in more 
challenges.65 The variety of costs incurred relative to the set-up and imple-
mentation of “on the ground due diligence systems” in the DRC or adjoin-
ing countries will be particularly expensive,66 because they are imposed on 
some of the “least developed and poorest countries of the world.”67 The 
mining in these countries is generally performed by “artisanal or small scale 
miners” struggling to make ends meet in tough economic conditions.68 Ad-
ditionally, trading companies, transporters, and concentrate treatment facili-
ties69 (all of which engage in contracts throughout mineral supply chains) 
will have to incur costs related to increased levels of “administration and 
auditing.”70 The costly measures include change of custody tagging, audits 
and risk assessments, mitigation implementation, and other ancillary re-
quirement costs.71 Because of these costs, and the potential ramifications of 
U.S. companies turning to other regions for their minerals, many fear a “de 
                                                            
 64  Letter from Kay Nimmo, Manager of Sustainability & Regulatory Affairs, ITRI Ltd., to Mary L. 
Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Feb. 25, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-40-10/s74010-83.pdf [hereinafter Nimmo Feb. 25]. 
 65  Vargo, supra note 55. Recall the path, submitted by Vargo, of the complex supply chain path in-
volved in just one manufacturing process discussed supra note 55: “[C]omplex supply chains do not 
have traceability of conflict minerals built in. . . . [We should] recognize that the needed reporting and 
information infrastructure on the ground in the [DRC] and capacity to provide fully validated supply 
chains for affected minerals does not yet exist.” Id. 
 66  Nimmo Feb. 25, supra note 64. 
 67  Id. 
 68  Id. 
 69  Id. 
 70  Id. 
 71  These ancillary costs include logbooks, database redesigns, and even government management 
schemes. Nimmo Feb. 25, supra note 64. 
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facto embargo” will result in the covered countries.72 
The SEC rule also interferes with existing anti-conflict measures, and 
threatens businesses and suppliers that are not responsible for funding con-
flict. The Minister for Energy and Minerals of the United Republic of Tan-
zania, for example, submitted a comment to the SEC emphasizing that “the 
mining industry in Tanzania is well regulated and has not been tainted with 
illegal minerals produced from the DRC.”73 In an effort to assure the SEC 
that Tanzanian minerals were “not financing, and have never financed the 
DRC conflict,”74 the Minister articulated a fear that many others have ex-
pressed: the conflict minerals rules result in “disproportionate share[s] of 
the compliance burden,” as well as an end to the responsible sourcing of 
materials from the region.75 This fear led some to ask for an implementation 
of § 1502 that would, where possible, minimize any “disruption to those 
members of the local population and the private sector in the region” that 
were not contributing to conflict.76 However, the SEC rule threatens even 
the responsible sourcing of minerals in the covered countries, steering re-
porting companies elsewhere in search of minerals. 
 B. Effects on Foreign Countries in General 
Aside from the “chilling effect[s]”77 in the covered countries, costs for 
businesses that are not involved in obtaining or treating DRC minerals 
throughout the supply chain will nevertheless be significant.78 The SEC rule 
                                                            
 72  Woody, supra note 13, at 1,346. “Congolese activists and others have continually asserted that 
this regulation will lead, and has already led, to an embargo of Congolese minerals, a drastic cost that 
would outweigh any purported benefits of the regulation. Indeed, with major American corporations 
shying away from using Congolese minerals, certain mines in Congo have suspended operations, forcing 
many Congolese out of work.” Id. at 1345-46. 
 73  Letter from William M. Ngeleja, Minister for Energy and Minerals, United Republic of Tanzania, 
to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (May 23, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-40-10/s74010-258.pdf. The Minister clarified that the Government of 
Tanzania “welcome[d] the intention behind [Dodd-Frank] section 1502,” distancing itself from any 
“strategic or self-interested objectives . . . [involving] conflict around DRC.” Id. However, the Govern-
ment’s concern involved the impact of the regulations on Tanzania’s mining industry and the fear that 
“compliance costs . . . could be as great for a manufacturer sourcing their minerals from Tanzania as 
they would be from the DRC.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 74  Id. 
 75  Id. 
 76  Letter from Kay Nimmo, Manager of Sustainability & Regulatory Affairs, ITRI Ltd., to Mary L. 
Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Oct. 19, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-40-10/s74010-338.pdf [hereinafter Nimmo Oct. 19]. 
 77  Letter from David Hirschmann, President and CEO, Ctr. For Capital Markets Competitiveness, 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and Myron Brilliant, Senior Vice President, Int’l Affairs, U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Feb. 28, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-40-10/s74010-87.pdf. 
 78  Nimmo Feb. 25, supra note 64. 
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could affect “nearly every manufacturing sector and facet of the supply 
chain,” causing negative results for those countries and businesses with 
minerals sourced outside of the covered countries.79 
First, the conflict minerals provisions do not provide effective dividing 
lines between minerals that are conflict free and those that are not. For ex-
ample, the term “conflict minerals” involves all cassiterite, wolframite, 
gold, and tantalum, thus placing a “reputational taint” across entire indus-
tries, even when minerals do not come from covered countries.80 This repu-
tational taint affects consumers and investors, who might become confused 
when businesses claim they indeed use “conflict minerals,” even if they are 
legitimately “DRC conflict free.”81 
Second, as reporting companies engage in due diligence, they will not 
be able to rely on supplier statements (including warranties) that products 
are conflict free, thus extending the burden of expensive and difficult due 
diligence to suppliers. This means that foreign companies will need to rise 
to the applicable due diligence standards “despite not facing any similar re-
quirements in their home jurisdiction.”82 Recalling the concerns of the Min-
ister of Tanzania, a disproportionate share of the compliance burden might 
fall on these foreign companies. Furthermore, despite any overlap or mutu-
ality cost efficiencies that might emerge where foreign suppliers fill supply 
contracts with more than one reporting company, this overlap nevertheless 
exacts costs that would not be applicable but for § 1502 and the SEC rule.83 
A similar theory posits that suppliers can determine the source of their min-
erals once and then spread the costs of determining the source across many 
issuer firms.84 Even so, this bottom-up approach yields increased costs to 
reporting companies buying from these suppliers and ignores the current 
supply agreements already in force.85 These are costs that foreign suppliers 
may be unwilling or unable to manage. 
The overarching theme is that the costs imposed by the conflict miner-
als rule extend beyond U.S. reporting companies. In the words of one com-
mentator, the “cost issue is not with reporting, but with the requirements for 
due diligence and audits.”86 Because foreign suppliers may be unwilling or 
                                                            
 79  Hirschmann, supra note 77. 
 80  Letter from John Crawley, CEO, Niotan, Inc., to Mary L. Schapiro, Chairwoman, Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n (Mar. 21, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-40-10/s74010-200.pdf. 
 81  Id. But see Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (violation of First 
Amendment to force companies to describe their minerals as not having been found to be “DRC conflict 
free”). 
 82  Woody, supra note 13, at 1,342. 
 83  Conflict Minerals Release, supra note 2, at 56,352 n.835. 
 84  Id. at 56,352. 
 85  Id. 
 86  Letter from Griffin Teggeman to Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Dec. 16, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-40-10/s74010-4.pdf. 
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unable to assume the additional burdens, these requirements will ultimately 
raise prices for the manufacture and production of products.87 
 V. DOES THE SEC RULE WORK? FIRST YEAR REPORTS ARE 
WEAKER THAN EXPECTED 
The first year of conflict minerals reporting, with Form SD’s and Con-
flict Minerals Reports filed at the beginning of June 2014, illustrates the 
costs and difficulties of complying with the SEC rule. Some have consid-
ered these filings “a mixed bag, to put it gently,” because reporting compa-
nies provided no “concrete information on the use of conflict minerals in 
their products.”88 Others have considered a majority of the reports “vague” 
as they dance around the “hot-potato language and ambiguities of not 
knowing what’s exactly in the business’ supply chain.”89 The poor response 
rates from reporting issuers and their suppliers show that there are signifi-
cant burdens to overcome before reporting companies will be prepared to 
face the full requirements of the SEC rule outside of the phase-in period.90 
First, the total number of reports actually filed was dramatically less 
than expected. Only 1,315 reporting companies filed disclosures with the 
SEC, a low number considering that 6,000 reporting companies were ex-
pected to file with the SEC.91 Of the 1,315 reporting companies that filed 
their reports, most were unable to determine the origin of their conflict min-
erals.92 Many reporting companies received inadequate information about 
                                                            
 87  Manufacturers, distillers, purifiers, and other key supply chain service providers may also be un-
willing or unable to comply with due diligence burdens. Those that are willing will bake due diligence 
expenditures into their prices. 
 88  Jofi Joseph, Global Risk Insights Funding War: U.S. Companies Disclose Conflict Mineral Use, 
OILPRICE.COM (July 17, 2014), http://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Funding-War-U.S.-
Companies-Disclose-Conflict-Mineral-Use.html. 
 89  Jim Leinaweaver, Companies’ Conflict Mineral Reports Are Mixed as SEC Deadline Passes, THE 
GUARDIAN (June 2, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2014/jun/02/sec-conflict-
mineral-deadline-reports-mixed-apple-intel-hp. 
 90  “[M]ultinational corporations often rely on a large multitude of third-party suppliers and previous-
ly lacked incentive to closely track supplies sourcing. However, we can expect more detailed and more 
accurate reports in coming years as companies adjust to the new expectations of transparency and dis-
closure.” 
Joseph, supra note 88. 
 91  Let’s Talk: Governance: First-Year Conflict Mineral Reporting Reveals Insights and Surprises, 
EY CTR. FOR BD. MATTERS, June 2014, at 1, 2, available at 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-lets-talk-governance-june-2014/$FILE/EY-lets-talk-
governance-june-2014.pdf. 
 92  Id. at 1. “[N]early 98 percent of companies . . . recently indicated they could not fully determine 
whether their products or components contained . . . conflict minerals . . . .” Conflict Minerals Compli-
ance Clock Ticks Away – Time’s Up, PR NEWSWIRE (July 25, 2014), http://www.virtual-
strategy.com/2014/07/25/conflict-minerals-compliance-clock-ticks-away-times. 
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their minerals from suppliers in the supply chain.93 The average number of 
suppliers surveyed by reporting companies in preparation for their conflict 
minerals reports was 2,500.94 Review of the 184 S&P companies that filed 
conflict minerals reports showed that only half of the reporting companies 
were able to “identify some portion of smelters as conflict-free and only 
27% provided a list of smelters and refiners” in their conflict minerals re-
ports.95 Additionally, only four companies obtained an independent private 
sector audit of their conflict minerals report, meaning an overwhelming ma-
jority of reporting companies relied on the phase-in period.96 
While some reporting companies did a better job of including “signifi-
cant detail” in their filings, these companies did so for pragmatic reasons, 
not because of the new disclosure requirements.97 For example, Apple Inc. 
and Intel Corp. included tables in their conflict minerals report listing the 
smelters and refiners where conflict minerals in their products were pro-
cessed, as well as the countries of origin for those minerals.98 Both conflict 
minerals reports outlined the companies’ conflict minerals programs in de-
tail, specifying all actions taken and alleging conformity with the OECD 
guidelines.99 Intel specified what actions it planned on taking in the future 
to identify the source of its unidentifiable minerals.100 But the reporting 
companies who provided such detail did so because it “furthers the princi-
ples laid out in their corporate responsibility statements and facilitates a 
bond with those consumers who prioritize such issues.”101 Much of this de-
tail was provided in a “public-facing way,” tailored more towards consumer 
preferences than required disclosure.102 
With a few exceptions, the first round of filed conflict minerals reports 
proved inconclusive with regard to the origin and processing facilities of the 
conflict minerals in the reporting companies’ products. And the phase-in 
                                                            
 93  “Many of these companies have complex supply chains and reported difficulties in tracing the 
origin of the [conflict minerals] in their products given insufficient supplier responses to their inquiries. 
Many companies reported that suppliers did not respond to questionnaires or did not provide complete 
or adequate responses. For this reason, many of the [conflict minerals reports] did not include the type of 
detail that may have been expected.” 
EY CTR. FOR BD. MATTERS, supra note 91, at 1. 
 94  Id. at 4. Note, however, that the number of suppliers surveyed ranged from 5 to almost 40,000. Id. 
 95  Id. at 3. 
 96  Id. at 2. 
 97  Joseph, supra note 88. 
 98  See Apple Inc., Conflict Minerals Report (Form SD) (May 30, 2014); Intel Corp., Conflict Miner-
als Report (Form SD) (May 22, 2014). 
 99  Apple Form SD, supra note 98; Intel Form SD, supra note 98. 
 100  Intel Form SD, supra note 98. 
 101  Id. Additionally, these reporting companies “recognize that supply chain transparency is not only 
an inevitable cost of doing business in the 21st century, but if properly handled, can also represent a 
growth opportunity.” Id. 
 102  Leinaweaver, supra note 89. 
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period’s allowance of a DRC conflict undeterminable designation means 
that reporting companies must still face an uphill battle in order for subse-
quent conflict minerals reports to be complete and accurate. 
 VI. “UNCONSCIONABLE?” THE DIFFICULTIES OF IMPOSING 
A REGULATORY FRAMEWORK ON FOREIGN COMPANIES 
THROUGH CONTRACTS 
What do these weak first-round disclosures and all the compliance 
costs mean for reporting companies and their suppliers in future years? As 
the phase-in period ends and reporting companies are expected to provide 
better conflict minerals disclosures, reporting companies will need to make 
more detailed reports, which will drive up compliance costs. Covered coun-
tries may provide the cheapest available minerals, but reporting companies 
will still need to increase product costs to “recoup the higher costs” of min-
erals obtained from compliant suppliers.103 More likely, however, the high 
compliance costs will provide incentives for issuers to choose only suppli-
ers that obtain their minerals from outside the covered countries.104 Yet, 
other foreign suppliers will still incur compliance costs, and potentially suf-
fer from the reputational taint that follows from being tagged as “conflict 
minerals.” 
In light of § 1502’s intended purpose and the SEC rule’s strict re-
quirements, reporting companies face the difficult decision of how best to 
navigate the three steps. Proponents of § 1502 argue that conflict mineral 
disclosures “shed . . . light” on the “life-and-death” issues involving the 
funding of conflict in covered countries.105 This transparency is intended to 
produce a “nation of consumers” and investors who feel a “responsibility to 
ensure that . . . economic activity” does not support conflict.106 
Since the disclosures are designed to change consumer and investor 
preferences, reporting companies must decide how to comply, especially as 
the phase-in period concludes. First, reporting companies can choose to 
continue their sourcing, including in covered countries, but with the added 
due diligence requirements and conflict minerals reports. Second, they may 
                                                            
 103  Conflict Minerals Release, supra note 2, at 56,351. 
 104  Id. 
 105  156 CONG. REC. S8, 318 (daily ed. May 17, 2010) (statement of Sen. Dick Durbin). 
 106  Id. At least one nonprofit group has provided a “consumer action guide,” so that consumers will 
“understand what actions companies are (or are not) taking to contribute to the creation of a clean min-
erals trade in Congo. . . . Use your consumer power to make more responsible purchasing decisions. 
Send messages to companies you purchase from, reminding them how important conflict-free from 
Congo is to you.” Conflict Minerals Company Rankings, RAISE HOPE FOR CONGO, 
http://www.raisehopeforcongo.org/content/ 
conflict-minerals-company-rankings (last visited March 30, 2014). 
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choose to use alternative minerals that do not fund conflict.107 Moreover, 
they might consider changing “product configuration[s]” to eliminate their 
need for conflict minerals altogether.108 In fact, compliance with the SEC 
rule may also prompt companies to include “conflict-free” notions as part of 
their company branding.109 Accounting firms are already encouraging com-
panies to engage in “strategic” supply chain processes in order to gain new 
customers.110 Some organizations are “passing resolutions to purchase only 
from companies that are conflict-free, including U.S. universities that have 
responded to student involvement in the Conflict-Free Campus Initia-
tive.”111 Several companies have even made significant progress in elimi-
nating conflict minerals from their supply chains.112 
Given the compliance costs discussed above, and absent any product 
reconfigurations, reporting companies will seek to improve their supply 
chains, in some cases becoming more “aggressive” in enforcing their sourc-
ing policies.113 While there is no explicit penalty for companies that do not 
comply with the SEC rule, manufacturers and producers will be concerned 
                                                            
 107  David C.W. Wagner, Breaking the Nexus Between Armed Conflict and Consumer Products: 
Where’s the App for That?, 26 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 103, 110 (2012). 
 108  10 Minutes on Conflict Minerals, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLC, May 2013, available at 
http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/10minutes/assets/pwc-10minutes-conflict-minerals.pdf. “One company, 
Cisco, has already received a shareholder’s resolution asking for a feasibility study to determine whether 
the minerals can be removed from Cisco’s entire supply chain altogether. This question posed by Cis-
co’s shareholders will not be the last as more socially responsible investors examine their portfolios and 
the conflict minerals reports filed in 2014 and beyond.” 
Marcia Narine, From Kansas to the Congo: Why Naming and Shaming Corporations Through the 
Dodd-Frank Act’s Corporate Governance Disclosure Won’t Solve a Human Rights Crisis, 25 REGENT 
U. L. REV. 351, 391–92 (2013). 
 109  See generally PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLC, supra note 108 (compliance with conflict min-
erals disclosure process will influence a company’s brand by maximizing the benefits and minimizing 
the risks). 
 110  Id. 
 111  PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLC, supra note 108. 
 112  See generally Sasha Lezhnev & Alex Hellmuth, Taking Conflict Out of Consumer Gadgets: 
Company Rankings on Conflict Minerals 2012, THE ENOUGH PROJECT, Aug. 2012, available at 
http://www.enoughproject.org/files/ 
CorporateRankings2012.pdf (identifying and ranking various electronics companies making progress in 
tracing, auditing, and certifying the minerals in their products). 
 113  See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLC, supra note 108 (because compliance with the conflict 
minerals rules will not be easy, no company can achieve compliance on its own; companies will need to 
pay attention to peer groups, optimize supply chains to ease the burdens of compliance, and use their 
purchasing power to provide leverage when negotiating with suppliers); see also Conflict Minerals: 
What You Need to Know About the New Disclosure and Reporting Requirements and How Ernst & 
Young Can Help, ERNST & YOUNG, 2012, available at http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ 
EY_CnflictMinerals/$FILE/EY_ConflictMinerals.pdf (recommending that reporting companies design 
detailed programs to ensure compliance, including segmenting suppliers into risk tiers, and execute and 
sustain due diligence processes). 
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about consumer and investor attitudes toward mineral sourcing.114 Making 
conflict mineral disclosures will prompt changes in company behavior, in 
many cases causing cancelled or breached contracts if reporting companies 
change their foreign suppliers immediately. 
 A. Supplier Contracts at Issue 
Legislative history, recommendations of accounting firms, and issuer 
behavior since the promulgation of the rules all indicate that secure supply 
lines require supplier cooperation.115 Reporting companies will make this 
point clear and will demand it in contract negotiations. Although manufac-
turers will “generally be able to exercise control only over Tier 1 suppliers,” 
this is no easy task.116 Even large companies have recognized that they lack 
any power to “unilaterally impose new contract terms and flow-down re-
quirements on . . . suppliers.”117 Generally, reporting companies will only 
be able to negotiate new conditions or commitments when existing con-
tracts are renewed or new contracts are entered into.118 Since normal supply 
contracts run anywhere from three to five years,119 some of these contracts 
will extend past the effective date of the SEC rule. If that is the case, what 
can U.S. reporting companies do when their suppliers refuse to modify an 
existing contract or immediately comply with due diligence procedures? 
The SEC attempted to solve this problem by introducing the phase-in 
period. For two years after the effective date, the SEC rule permits report-
ing companies that are unable to determine the origin of their minerals to 
                                                            
 114  See Narine, supra note 108, at 351 (“This ‘name-and-shame’ law, which does not actually make 
it illegal to source minerals from the Congo, aims to provide transparency to consumers and investors so 
that they can make informed choices about the companies with which they choose to do business. On the 
surface, this makes sense in an era in which companies are hyper-vigilant about their reputations.”). 
 115  “Virtually no company can achieve compliance on its own. [Companies] will need to rely on 
[their] suppliers, who will likely need to turn to their own suppliers to gather information about the 
origin of materials . . . [used in their] products.” PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLC, supra note 108. 
 116  Vargo, supra note 55. Some analysis on contractual relations between producers and their suppli-
ers has been provided in the context of the phase-in period envisioned by the final version of the SEC 
rule: “It is important to understand the complexity of a modern supply chain in order to understand why 
a phase-in is critical to achieve the intent of the legislation and for companies to be able to reasonably 
comply with it. . . . [M]anufacturers and those contracting to manufacture will generally be able to exer-
cise control only over Tier 1 suppliers, with whom they are in privity of contract which experience 
shows diminishes substantially as one moves further down the supply chain to the raw materials produc-
ers.” Id. 
 117  Letter from Benedict S. Cohen, Chief Counsel for Gov’t Operations, The Boeing Co., to Mary L. 
Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Oct. 18, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-40-10/s74010-436.pdf [hereinafter Cohen Oct. 18]. Note also that 
there is the possibility that reporting companies may have far more bargaining power (leverage) when 
pressuring small foreign suppliers to comply at least where these suppliers need contracts to survive. 
 118  Vargo, supra note 55; see also Cohen Oct. 18, supra note 117. 
 119  Cohen Oct. 18, supra note 117. 
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describe those minerals as “DRC conflict undeterminable” in their Conflict 
Minerals Report.120 These reports do not need a separate independent pri-
vate sector audit report as would normally be required.121 Thus, the phase-in 
period provides reporting companies with some measure of flexibility, at 
least for two years. A phase-in period is especially helpful for smaller com-
panies where compliance costs are great and there is a lack of “leverage to 
pressure suppliers . . . to certify” the source of their minerals.122 Additional-
ly, the phase-in period is appropriate because it allows companies more 
time in adapting “these broader global initiatives to their individual facts 
and circumstances.”123 However, this relatively short delay will not resolve 
problems with costs.124 The phase-in period only addresses issues of timing, 
merely pushing back when expenses have to be incurred for due diligence. 
When the window expires, reporting companies must be compliant with 
regulations. Moreover, reporting companies may still have contracts with 
their suppliers that extend beyond the limited phase-in period. 
 B. Contract Choices for U.S. Reporting Companies 
Reporting companies are responsible for complying with the SEC 
rule’s three step procedures by the applicable deadlines, leaving them with 
very few compliance options in the meantime.125 First, they will attempt to 
modify or create new contracts with provisions extending the costs of due 
diligence to suppliers.126 By imposing these requirements, reporting compa-
nies will make due diligence inquiries easier, more accurate, and certainly 
more comprehensive. The benefits of such requirements are not lost on re-
porting companies or their accounting advisors: they create more responsive 
mineral procurement processes, streamline supplier bases, and reward man-
ufacturers (particularly those dealing with thousands of products) with time-
ly, detailed, and accurate information.127 
Second, where contractual limitations cannot be set because a foreign 
supplier will not agree to comply with due diligence requirements, reporting 
companies will try to establish a system of “centralized control.”128 This 
                                                            
 120  Conflict Minerals Release, supra note 2, at 56, 281. 
 121  Id. at 56,283. 
 122  Id. at 56,288 n.122. 
 123  Id. 
 124  See, e.g., Costs and Consequences of Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, at 15. 
 125  This is why companies have been encouraged to “comply by the deadlines—start now.” 
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLC, supra note 108. 
 126  As indicated supra, note 5, this situation prompted initial research for this note. 
 127  PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLC, supra note 108. 
 128  See Kevin Zheng Zhou & Dean Xu, How Foreign Firms Curtail Local Supplier Opportunism in 
China: Detailed Contracts, Centralized Control, and Relational Governance, 43 J. INT’L BUS. STUDIES 
677, 679 (2012). While Zhou and Xu focus their analysis on supply-side opportunism in China, they do 
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system consists of a “vertical control structure,” where powerful buyers 
seek to control a smaller supplier’s behavior by “influencing the latter’s 
product design, production processes, and quality control procedures” out-
side of any contractual provisions.129 However, suppliers will be cautious 
about establishing any pattern or form of course of dealing or performance 
that might result in future unintended obligations.130 More likely, the SEC 
rule’s requirements, and the contract provisions that result, will delay re-
porting companies from developing the vertical control structures they 
would like to see implemented. Additionally, smaller reporting companies 
that do not command the same type of leverage as larger ones will not bene-
fit from any vertical control benefits. 
Reporting companies will begin to obtain minerals from alternative 
suppliers (and breach existing contracts when necessary) if their foreign 
suppliers will not accept new contract terms or submit to vertical control 
structures.131 After all, the freedom to contract includes the freedom to 
breach, especially where a breach would be more efficient for a company’s 
business outlook.132 
 C. Foreign Courts and American Contracts 
Because of “today’s globalized markets,” reporting companies will not 
be able to rely on American courts and contract law to enforce conflict min-
erals contract provisions with their suppliers.133 First, uncertainties about 
contractual obligations between parties are “assessed differently according 
to the law applicable” in other countries.134 If a foreign court scrutinizes a 
reporting company’s contract with a foreign supplier, contract terms might 
be subject to unfamiliar court doctrines and ultimately evaluated differently 
than in the United States. Second, the “place of jurisdiction” in intercompa-
                                                                                                                                          
so in the context of sourcing “from local suppliers in emerging markets.” Id. at 677. This analysis, then, 
overlaps much of the buyer-supplier interactions involving the covered countries of the conflict mineral 
rules, especially if their markets could be considered emerging. 
 129  Id. at 679. 
 130  “A contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, includ-
ing conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of such a contract.” U.C.C. § 2-204 (2013) 
(emphasis added). “‘Agreement’ . . . means the bargain of the parties in fact, as found in their language 
or inferred from other circumstances, including course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of 
trade.” U.C.C. § 1-201 (2013) (emphasis added). More on first-year contracts class to come. 
 131  While this paper focuses on foreign suppliers, contractual disputes may also arise between Amer-
ican companies and their first tier American suppliers. These suppliers, by virtue of their not filing re-
ports with the SEC, may not be required to abide by the conflict minerals rule. 
 132  Remember that the prospect of new customers buying conflict-free products may be a powerful 
motivation in making business decisions. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLC, supra note 108. 
 133  Thomas Dietz, Contract Law, Relational Contracts, and Reputation Networks in International 
Trade: An Empirical Investigation into Cross-Border Contracts in the Software Industry, 37 LAW & 
SOC. INQUIRY 25, 25 (2012). 
 134  Id. at 26. 
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ny agreements is not always clearly accepted by all parties.135 Finally, it is 
doubtful whether judgments will be enforced in foreign states, meaning 
court decisions in one jurisdiction might be “undone” by the judicial and 
enforcement processes in another.136 
One important critique of § 1502 revealed a flaw in enforcement: the 
DRC’s government (and perhaps other governments in the region) might 
not have the infrastructure to enforce the principles embodied in contracts 
and agreements along supply chains.137 § 1502 and the SEC rule’s institu-
tional framework might not be able to function “without much state sup-
port,”138 leaving contracts looking more like “communication docu-
ments”139 than enforceable obligations. Even in countries with stronger 
“state enforcement bodies,”140 reporting companies may find themselves in 
expensive litigation as a result of an intentional contract breach. 
When reporting companies breach their contracts, the policies and 
rules behind conflict minerals disclosures may conflict with what would 
otherwise be enforceable contract provisions. For example, conflict of laws 
between jurisdictions will promote the inefficient and “dirty” results of fo-
rum shopping.141 Foreign-supplier plaintiffs will “naturally” seek a jurisdic-
tion where they think their cases can be “most favorably presented.”142 For-
eign litigation will not come cheap for reporting companies, and it may 
result in a determination preventing the much needed gathering of infor-
mation for proper conflict minerals disclosures. This is particularly true 
where, branded with all the negative connotations breach implies, a report-
ing company has unlawfully terminated a binding contract to find a con-
flict-minerals-compliant supplier. 
Contract breaches, like the costs of supply chain due diligence, will 
travel upstream, meaning second-, third-, and fourth-tier suppliers will face 
contract breaches and disputes with one another.143 While it may take time 
for flow down requirements to reach upstream sources, these provisions 
                                                            
 135  Id. 
 136  Id. 
 137  For example, large firms have operated with “impunity in weak or fragile states because these 
host states do not have the power or will to respect their own citizens’ rights or to enforce labor or envi-
ronmental laws.” Narine, supra note 108, at 365. Of course, this very argument has also led some com-
mentators to suggest that because these large transnational corporations have such “power and influ-
ence” they should have “commensurate responsibility regarding social issues.” Id. 
 138  Dietz, supra note 133, at 27. 
 139  Id. at 33. 
 140  Id. 
 141  Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Forum Shopping, Antisuit Injunctions, Negative Declarations, and Relat-
ed Tools of International Litigation, 91 AM J. INT’L L. 314, 314 (1997). 
 142  Id. 
 143  “[S]maller, less sophisticated and capable participants at all points in the supply chain will face 
converse challenges in attempting to familiarize themselves with and resource the new requirements.” 
Cohen Oct. 18, supra note 117. 
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will result in contract disputes further removed from the final manufacturers 
of minerals. These disputes even involve “confidential commercial agree-
ments,”144 wherein certain information pertaining to suppliers has been con-
tractually protected.145 
Regardless of the parties, contracts enforced in or subject to the laws 
of foreign jurisdictions may result in unfavorable judicial determinations for 
reporting companies trying to force conflict minerals due diligence expens-
es on their foreign suppliers. Even where reporting companies have suc-
ceeded in securing foreign supplier’s cooperation with the SEC rule, subse-
quent foreign litigation and upstream breaches increase the total costs of 
conflict minerals disclosures. These increased costs and the subsequent con-
tract provisions that follow show that the SEC rule is not the best solution 
to the problem of conflict minerals. 
 VII. THE BEST SOLUTION? GREATER INTERNATIONAL 
INVOLVEMENT IS NEEDED TO EFFECTUATE THE PURPOSES OF § 
1502 
Congress and the SEC underestimated the true costs of the conflict 
minerals provisions, which will damage contract relations with foreign sup-
pliers. The added expense of foreign litigation, damages determinations and 
payments, injunctions preventing business interactions, and the concomitant 
costs on litigating suppliers were not adequately considered and weighed by 
Congress or the SEC.146 The SEC, whenever it engages in its rulemaking 
capacity, is required to consider whether an action will “promote efficiency, 
competition, and capital formation.”147 Interestingly, the SEC admitted that 
it was not able to assess or quantify how effective § 1502 would be in 
achieving its intended results.148 Furthermore, it noted that “the social bene-
                                                            
 144  Jim Low, Conflict Minerals: Time to Develop a Compliance Strategy, FIN. EXECUTIVE, Oct. 
2012, 13, 14. 
 145  One commentator suggested revisions to the conflict minerals rule, providing that “due regard 
shall be given to confidential information of suppliers and the independence of supply chain auditors,. . . 
and request should be limited to that which is necessary to satisfy the requirements under the rules.” 
Letter from Andreas Lackner, President & CEO, Global Tungsten & Powders, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, 
Secretary, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Oct. 13, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-40-
10/s74010-330.pdf. 
 146  “A House Financial Services Committee memo said that Section 1502 was added to the Dodd-
Frank Act during the House-Senate conference negotiations, without the benefit of a legislative hearing 
on the proposal. As a result, Congress did not examine how Section 1502 would be implemented, 
whether it would help end the conflict in the DRC, and what its effects would be on the DRC, the com-
panies that use these minerals to manufacture goods used by consumers and other manufacturers, or the 
broader economy.” 
Jim Hamilton, SEC Conflict Minerals Regulations Could Do More Harm than Good, CORPORATE 
SECRETARY’S GUIDE, available at 2013 WL 3178378. 
 147  Exchange Act Release No. 34-63547, 75 Fed. Reg. 80,948, 80,970 (2010). 
 148  Conflict Minerals Release, supra note 2, at 56,335. But see Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 
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fits are quite different from the economic or investor protection benefits that 
our rules ordinarily strive to achieve.”149 
If private contracting still has any place as the best policy in enforcing 
private dealings, the SEC and Congress should realize that the conflict min-
erals disclosure scheme may not work as well as originally intended. As 
long as the SEC rule collides with contracts, the resulting conflicts of law, 
judicial decisions, and general disagreement between reporting companies 
and foreign suppliers may only prove that due diligence and conflict miner-
als disclosures are more taxing and controversial than originally anticipated. 
At least one author was correct then, when he characterized § 1502 as a 
“step forward,” but only to the extent it is a “band-aid on an arterial 
wound.”150 
Given § 1502’s intended social benefits, the growing desires of a con-
sumer body bent on buying clean products, and the blooming recognition of 
the ability and responsibility to curb human rights abuses, the “arterial 
wound” may only be healed through greater international efforts in ending 
the conflict minerals trade. When contracts and a U.S. regulatory scheme 
cannot achieve those ends, the international stage can fill the gaps. 
The “obvious”151 solution must involve “commitment, not just by the 
United States, but also by the entire international community.”152 Most im-
portant, “large market[]” players, especially governments and large busi-
nesses, must recognize the roles they play in funding conflict, and the po-
tential they have to eradicate that conflict.153 This includes enacting 
legislation “similar to section 1502 to widen the circle of responsibility.”154 
One possible measure would be a “tagging and tracing” program, enabling 
both businesses and authorities to easily identify the origins of certain min-
                                                                                                                                          
F.3d 359, 369–70 (2014) (though holding the SEC’s cost analysis was reasonable, noted, “Here, the 
rule’s benefits would occur half-a-world away in the midst of an opaque conflict about which little relia-
ble information exists, and concern a subject about which the Commission has no particular expertise. 
Even if one could estimate how many lives are saved or rapes prevented as a direct result of the final 
rule, doing so would be pointless because the costs of the rule—measured in dollars—would create an 
apples-to-bricks comparison. . . . What the Commission did not do, despite many comments suggesting 
it, was question the basic premise that a disclosure regime would help promote peace and stability in the 
Congo. . . . If the Commission had found that disclosure would fail of its essential purpose, then it could 
not have adopted any rule under the Association’s view of §§ 78w(a)(2) and 78c(f). But promulgating 
some rule is exactly what Dodd-Frank required the Commission to do.”). 
 149  Conflict Minerals Release, supra note 2, at 56,335. 
 150  Wagner, supra note 107, at 104. Wagner’s thesis centered around two insufficiencies in the § 
1502 implementation: (1) the conflict minerals rule is not feasible because of implementation that is too 
quick and that does not take into account the difficult security situation in the eastern DRC or the prob-
lems of smuggling, and (2) the rule places the heaviest burden on those whom the provision originally 
seeks to protect (creating a de facto embargo). 
 151  Id. at 128. 
 152  Id. 
 153  Id. at 139. 
 154  Id. at 139-40. 
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erals.155 International players can also provide financial assistance and tech-
nical support for enforcing laws, punishing smuggling, and targeting other 
“networks” that continue to fund conflict.156 Furthermore, foreign courts 
need to be prepared to enforce contract provisions that reflect an interna-
tional consensus in pursuing such provisions. In order to ensure that efforts 
like § 1502 will not be “counterproductive,” any action must be regarded as 
“credible,” demonstrating “comprehensive support” by governments, the 
international community, and “affected issuers.”157 
Because of the need for comprehensive support, the unreliability and 
uncertainty of foreign courts, and the expensive and controversial results of 
§ 1502 and the SEC rule, the best solution is to heed those who originally 
advocated for more delays.158 Delaying the implementation of conflict min-
erals due diligence and disclosure procedures will allow other key interna-
tional players to catch up with the United States. Such delays will ultimate-
ly solve several problems confronting § 1502 and its humanitarian 
objectives. 
First, where international standards make conflict minerals due process 
and disclosures the norm, contractual terms outlining such processes will be 
more enforceable, in line with predictable court determinations and contract 
interpretations in foreign jurisdictions. Issuers and suppliers will be able to 
enter contracts with mutual understanding and agreement on essential con-
flict minerals terms. 
Second, a delay and subsequent international commitment would solve 
administrative, legislative, and economic problems affecting the DRC and 
the adjoining region—the very areas where conflict minerals are sourced. 
For example, the problems of unsupportive governments,159 which are often 
                                                            
 155  Wagner, supra note 107, at 130. 
 156  Id. at 139-40. 
 157  Id. at 140. “Section 1502 has potential. Implemented correctly, and supplemented by intelligent 
foreign assistance by . . . the international community, section 1502 could help transform [the covered 
countries region]. . . . Transformation starts by accepting responsibility. In some ways, section 1502 
does that by recognizing the link between violence in the eastern DRC and consumer products sold in 
the United States. But acknowledging a link is not enough. . . . Businesses must also accept that, in a 
globalized world, they too have a responsibility to ensure their actions do not contribute to human rights 
violations.” 
Id. at 140 (emphasis added). 
 158  While many of these calls for delay came during the SEC’s rule—making process the comments 
of one African spokesperson might be easily applicable to a more generalized delay: “We ask for the 
SEC to delay their requirements to also enable US companies to delay their decision to stop the Congo 
minerals trade.” Nimmo Oct. 19, supra note 76. 
 159  “The conflict minerals crisis in DRC is multi-faceted, complex, and unlikely to be resolved 
through due diligence efforts alone. . . . Lasting solutions require long term investments of time, energy, 
and resources. . . . Efforts like Dodd-Frank’s disclosure and reporting requirements are a promising start, 
but they need to be implemented in conjunction with more comprehensive measures. . . . Unfortunately, 
the lack of competent governance in DRC will most likely pose a significant challenge to the implemen-
tation of any restructuring measures.” 
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plagued by corruption160 or lack of enforceability resources, can be mitigat-
ed.161 Additionally, international support would ensure no de facto embar-
gos emerge, especially where countries and their mining activities are cur-
rently unconnected with any funding of conflict. Moreover, other legislative 
and regulatory bodies—both in and outside of the United States—might be 
a better fit for tackling conflict minerals regulation.162 
Third, a delay and international catch-up can help spread the costs 
across all interested and involved investors and consumers—not just com-
panies who are required to make periodic disclosures.163 When due dili-
gence and disclosure are commonly accepted and enforced and the entire 
                                                                                                                                          
Emily Veale, Is There Blood on Your Hands-Free Device?: Examining Legislative Approaches to the 
Conflict Minerals Problem in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 21 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
503, 543 (2013). 
 160  While transparency is a “lofty and laudable goal[],” the “extraterritorial information-forcing 
measures . . . do not target corruption directly, . . . but rather depend upon stakeholders with the incen-
tives and capacity to utilize disclosed information to police and guard against official misconduct.” Dan-
iel M. Firger, Transparency and the Natural Resource Curse: Examining the New Extraterritorial In-
formation Forcing Rules in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act of 2010, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1,043, 
1,050 (2010). Firger’s article discusses “transparency-based regulation,” which has solved some other-
wise “intractable problems” in certain regions plagued by corrupt governments, but which has created 
“new problems for which there are no easy answers.” Id. at 1,077. “The strength of disclosure-based 
regulations . . . depends upon properly incentivized stakeholders who can make use of disclosed infor-
mation to police misconduct.” Id. at 1,077-78. Interestingly, Firger points out that “disclosure and inves-
tor protection,” which the Exchange Act reporting requirements are founded upon, “are at their weakest 
where information-forcing measures target secondary actors and where stakeholders’ incentives are not 
aligned.” Id. at 1,094. 
 161  For example, “uniform standards, made enforceable through legislation in all of the CACMC 
[conflict afflicted conflict minerals countries], are a good first step” in ending problems of corruption 
and collusion where weak governance constitutes an “endemic problem.” Wagner, supra note 107, at 
130. 
 162  See Woody, supra note 13, at 1,351 (the SEC is not “concerned with international human rights 
or diplomacy issues and should not have its resources tapped to regulate section 1502”); see also Lynn, 
supra note 9, at 330 (“[T]he new Specialized Corporate Disclosure provisions of . . . Dodd-Frank . . . 
were borne out of discrete public policy concerns, rather than concerns that shareholders or potential 
investors in public issuers were being misled or kept in the dark about the level of involvement of public 
issuers in the use of conflict minerals, mine safety issues, or the payments to governments made by 
companies in extractive resource industries. As a result, these Specialized Corporate Disclosure provi-
sions represent a historic shift away from the SEC’s mission to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly 
and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.”). 
 163  Some conflict-minerals-rule commentators discussed their experiences with similar conflict 
measures and the subsequent benefits of working in a multi-stakeholder environment: “We have under-
taken to directly address our concern[s] through active participation in . . . multi-stakeholder fo-
rum[s]. . . . In our experience, sustainability requires not only due diligence and high standards on the 
part of entrepreneurs, but also recognition of the need for transition in difficult social and economic cir-
cumstances. It requires progressive improvement and constructive engagement among participants in 
the . . . supply chain.” 
Letter from Stewart Murray, Chief Exec., London Bullion Mkt. Ass’n, to Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, 
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Aug. 5, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/ comments/s7-40-10/s74010-
293.pdf (emphasis added). 
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global community supports and pays for those standards, the costs will be 
more fairly and equitably allocated. 
While delays certainly permit the continuation of human rights abuses, 
they will enable subsequent international involvement to better achieve the 
goals of ending such abuses. So far, the European Union has at least pro-
posed a system of self-certification for responsible trading from conflict 
zones.164 But final regulations at the EU and in other countries may still 
take time, especially if “[s]upport by EU Member States through their own 
policies and instruments” is to be realized.165 An American “band-aid” will 
not suffice, especially where unintended consequences continue to drive up 
costs on reporting companies, suppliers, consumers, and even those in the 
covered countries themselves. Furthermore, this “band-aid” may not pass 
muster in foreign courts, where conflict minerals requirements are not 
standards already applicable—by legislation or otherwise. 
 VIII. CONCLUSION 
While the goals of Dodd-Frank § 1502 and its accompanying SEC 
conflict minerals rule are admirable and desirable, this legislative activity 
cannot currently achieve and sustain its intended goals.166 The labor- and 
cost-intensive conflict minerals disclosure process undoubtedly necessitates 
the cooperation of suppliers.167 Many suppliers failed to provide the infor-
mation needed to make adequate disclosures in recently filed reports. Better 
information will be required from reporting companies in their contracts 
with suppliers. Awkwardly, the costs involved in gathering and supplying 
this information will taint relations with suppliers, leading to controversial 
contract terms and breaches. This tension will only drive additional unfore-
seen negative consequences, including de facto embargos and upstream 
supply chain disputes.168 Until the international community demonstrates 
                                                            
 164  Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council, EUR. PARL. DOC. 
(COM 111) (2014), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/march/ tradoc_152227.pdf. 
 165  Press Release, European Comm’n, EU Proposes Responsible Trading Strategy for Minerals from 
Conflict Zones (Mar. 5, 2014), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-218_en.htm. 
 166  See, e.g., Veale, supra note 159, at 526-27 (“A System of SEC regulation does not adequately 
combat human rights abuses tied to the minerals trade. . . . Public disclosure laws, like those in Dodd-
Frank, should be considered the first step of a larger, more comprehensive, scheme of legislation. Spe-
cifically, such a scheme would include public disclosures of due diligence, as in Dodd-Frank, along with 
distribution of foreign assistance tied to the Congolese government’s cooperation in achieving specific 
goals.”). Also note this warning from a former Chief Counsel of the Division of Corporation Finance at 
the SEC: “Before utilizing this approach in the future, Congress . . . should carefully evaluate how the 
Specialized Corporate Disclosure provisions have been implemented and whether they have achieved 
their intended effect without being unduly burdensome on public issuers and their investors.” Lynn, su-
pra note 9, at 355. 
 167  EY CTR. FOR BD. MATTERS, supra note 91, at 8. 
 168  “Overly burdensome regulations could make the cost of compliance with Section 1502 outweigh 
6HARLINE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/29/15 2:00 PM 
Can We Make Them Obey? 
35:439 (2015) 
467 
greater commitment to solving the conflict minerals trade, legislative 
schemes like § 1502 and the SEC conflict minerals rule will not succeed in 
ending the abuses they aim to prevent.169 
                                                                                                                                          
the benefits, and decrease company incentives to source conflict-free minerals from the Eastern Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo. . . . The four minerals that will be regulated—tin, tantalum, tungsten and 
gold—are used in everyday goods like tin cans, light bulbs, ballpoint pens, and sewing thread. Thou-
sands of companies will bear the cost of implementing Section 1502, and the Congolese people will face 
further economic hardship if companies are not able to access these minerals.” 
Letter from David M. Sindelar, Chief Exec. Officer, Viasystems Grp., Inc., to Mary L. Schapiro, Chair-
man, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Aug. 9, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-40-
10/s74010-577.pdf (emphasis added). 
 169  See Wagner, supra note 107, at 104: 
“To be effective, a system for transparently tracking the mineral supply chain must be 
implemented not just in the DRC, but in neighboring countries as well. The United States 
and the international community must work . . . to increase institutional controls over the 
mining industry, increase transparency . . . and help . . . crack down on smuggling.”  
 
